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 STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
 
________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 317, 
 
                                                          Petitioner, 
 
           -and-                                                             CASE NO. C-6370 
 
TOWN OF MARCELLUS, 
 
                                                 Employer. 
 
________________________________________ 
 
 
 CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act; 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 317 has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the 
unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All full-time Motor Equipment Operators and Deputy Highway 
Superintendent. 
   
   Excluded: All other employees. 
 
Certification - C-6370 - 2 - 
 
 
 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 317.  The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party.  
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED:  November 15, 2016 
               Albany, New York 
 
        
                                                                      
 


 STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
 
________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
BROTHERHOOD OF WESTERN NEW YORK 
WATER WORKS, 
 
                                                          Petitioner, 
 
           -and-                                                             CASE NO. C-6400 
 
ERIE COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY, 
 
                                                 Employer, 
 
           -and- 
 
LOCAL 930, AFSCME, COUNCIL 66, 
 
                                                          Intervenor. 
 
________________________________________ 
 
 
 CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act; 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Brotherhood of Western New York Water 
Workers has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
Certification - C-6400 - 2 - 
 
 
 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
Included: Cleaner, Automotive Mechanic Helper, Automotive Mechanic, 
Water Utility Worker, Stores Clerk, Line Maintenance Operator, 
Water Plant Helper, Water Treatment Plant Operator Trainee, 
Water Treatment Plant Operator, Meter Service Worker, 
Dispatcher, Bill Collector, Control Operator, Pump Mechanic and 
Diesel Generator Mechanic. 
   
   Excluded: All others. 
 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Brotherhood of Western New York Water Workers.  The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party.  Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED:  November 15, 2016 
               Albany, New York  
                                                       
        
 STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
ARLENE MOREL, 
 
                                                       Petitioner, 
 
         -and-                                        CASE NO. C-6405 
 
VILLAGE OF SLEEPY HOLLOW, 
 
                                                       Employer, 
 
          -and- 
 
LOCAL 456, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF TEAMSTERS, 
 
                                                       Incumbent/Intervenor. 
________________________________________ 
 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 
 On May 27, 2016, Arlene Morel (petitioner) filed, in accordance with the Rules of 
Procedure of the Public Employment Relations Board, a timely petition for 
decertification of the Local 456, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (intervenor), the 
current negotiating representative for employees of the Village of Sleepy Hollow.  
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they stipulated 
that the following negotiating unit was appropriate:  
 Included: Assistant Court Clerk, Bookkeeper (Part-time), Court Clerk, 
Crossing Guard (Hourly), Intermediate Clerk (Part-time) (Hourly), 
Office Assistant, Parking Enforcement (Hourly), Payroll Clerk, 
Recreation Assistant, Recreation Assistant (Part-time), Recreation 
Supervisor, Staff Assistant Finance & Administration and Assistant 
Building Inspector. 
Certification - C-6405 page 2 
 
 
 Excluded: All other employees. 
  
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on September 21, 
2016, at which a majority of ballots were cast in favor of the intervenor.  
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
voters in the unit who cast ballots desire to be represented by the intervenor for the 
purpose of collective negotiations, the incumbent remains the exclusive representative 
of the unit employees and IT IS ORDERED that the petition is dismissed.        
DATED:  November 15, 2016 
               Albany, New York 
       
                                                          
 
 STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
TOWN OF CANANDAIGUA HIGHWAY 
EMPLOYEES’ ASSOCIATION, 
 
                                                          Petitioner, 
 
           -and-                                                             CASE NO. C-6425 
 
TOWN OF CANANDAIGUA, 
 
                                                 Employer.            
________________________________________ 
 
 
 CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act; 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Town of Canandaigua Highway Employees’ 
Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All full-time and regular part-time Motor Equipment Operators, 
Working Supervisors and Motor Equipment Operator IVs employed 
in the Town Highway, Water and Recycling Departments working at 
least fifteen (15) hours per work week. 
Certification - C-6425 - 2 - 
 
 
 
   
   Excluded: All other titles. 
 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Town of Canandaigua Highway Employees’ Association.  
The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party.  Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED:  November 15, 2016 
               Albany, New York 
 
        
                                                                    
 
    
   STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
____________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
BUFFALO TEACHERS FEDERATION, 
 
Charging Party,   CASE NO. U- 26208 
- and - 
 
BUFFALO CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
 
Respondent. 
____________________________________________ 
 
RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE, GENERAL COUNSEL (TIMOTHY CONNICK  
of counsel), for Charging Party 
 
JAECKLE FLEISCHMAN & MUGEL, LLP (JAMES N. SCHMIT of counsel),  
for Respondent  
 
 BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions to a decision of an administrative law judge.1  In 
her decision, the ALJ found that the Buffalo City School District (District) violated § 209-a.1 (a) 
of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) by threatening members of the Buffalo 
Teachers Federation (BTF) with layoffs unless they convinced the BTF to abandon a 
grievance, and then carrying out that threat.  
EXCEPTIONS 
 The District excepts to the ALJ’s decision on four grounds.  First, the District contends 
that the record did not support the ALJ’s finding that the layoffs constituted a violation of the 
Act as the final step of a preconceived plan to pressure the BTF into withdrawing the 
grievance.  Second, the District maintains that the ALJ erred because she “failed to 
acknowledge that the District’s decision to lay off the teachers was made prior to the July 29, 
                                            
1 47 PERB ¶ 4501 (2014). 
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2005 letter and prior to the August 5, 2005 meeting, and, therefore improperly found that the 
alleged employer misconduct caused the adverse employment action.”2 
The District’s third exception asserts that the remedy of reinstatement with back pay 
was inappropriate on the ground that, in cases of direct dealing, the employee organization’s 
rights, and not those of individual employees, are infringed.  Finally, the District contends that 
the ALJ erred by “refusing to give any weight to the Fourth Department’s ruling that [the 
arbitrator] exceeded his authority in ordering that the laid off teachers be reinstated.”3 
The BTF filed a response supporting the ALJ’s decision and remedial order. 
We affirm as modified the ALJ’s decision and remedial order. 
FACTS 
 The parties entered into a stipulation of facts, dated June 25, 2012, and supporting 
exhibits upon which the ALJ based her factual findings.  The District and the BTF are parties to 
a collective bargaining agreement covering the period July 1, 1999 through June 30, 2004.4  
The expired agreement provides unit members and retirees a choice of four health insurance 
alternatives.5  
 The parties have been engaged in negotiations for a successor agreement since 
February 2004; as of the date of the stipulation, no agreement had been reached.  On 
February 19, 2004, the District provided the BTF with a written proposal regarding health 
insurance, which included changing to a single health insurance carrier.6   
 On May 11, 2005, the District’s Board of Education passed a resolution, effective July 1, 
2005, naming Blue Cross and Blue Shield as the District’s single health insurance carrier for its 
                                            
2 Exceptions, ¶ 2. 
3 Id., ¶ 4. 
4 Joint Exhibit A. 
5 Agreement, Article XXVI (2), at p. 68, et seq.  
6 Joint Exhibit B. 
Case No. U-26208  - 3 - 
 
 
employees.7  On May 12, 2005, the interim superintendent of schools sent a letter to all District 
employees informing them that the Board of Education voted to have all District health care 
benefits provided through a single carrier.8  On or about May 20, 2005, BTF filed a grievance 
regarding the District’s change to a single health insurance carrier.9  The grievance was denied 
by the District at level III by letter dated June 8, 2005.10  Although the implementation date for 
the unilateral change to a single health insurance carrier was initially announced as July 1, 
2005, the District subsequently changed the date of implementation to September 1, 2005.  
 On July 29, 2005, the District sent a letter to approximately 88 then-current BTF 
members, stating that: 
This letter is to inform you that the District does not 
anticipate being able to offer you an opportunity to work as a 
teacher in the coming school year…. As you may have 
heard, the District will be moving its teachers, engineers, 
white collar and blue collar unions to a single health 
insurance carrier.  However, because of the pending 
arbitration hearings which might force the District back to 
multiple carriers, the District must make cuts now, and bring 
employees back only if and when it is clear that the single 
health issue is decided in the District’s favor….It is our 
sincere hope that we can call employees back to work at the 
earliest possible date. If we had agreement on single 
provider health insurance, that would be immediately.   
 
*** 
 
The Superintendent wants to meet with any laid-off 
employee who wishes to do so.  A meeting time has been 
set up for affected members of the Buffalo Teachers 
Federation on Friday, August 5, from 9:00 a.m. until 10 a.m. 
in Room 801 City Hall.11 
 
  The District’s superintendent, James Williams, met with BTF unit members on August 
                                            
7 Joint Exhibit C. 
8 Joint Exhibit D. 
9 Joint Exhibit E. 
10 Joint Exhibit F. 
11 Joint Exhibit G (emphasis in original).  
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5, 2005 in the District’s board room.  The meeting was attended by approximately 43 of the to-
be-laid-off BTF unit employees.  As of the meeting on August 5, 2005, the employees notified 
that they would be laid off had not yet been laid off and were current employees. 
 At the arbitration hearing over the grievance filed by BFT, the parties adduced testimony 
from three witnesses who were present at the August 5, 2005 meeting.  Hoa Mai, an 
attendance teacher laid off at the end of August 2005, testified that the superintendent told 
those present that they had been laid off as a result of the rising cost of health insurance and 
that if “we went to one single carrier and dropped the arbitration we would be hired back.”12 
 Similarly, Laurie Twistbinder, another teacher, testified that the superintendent said “that 
if we who had lost our jobs would go back and pressure our union to drop the [single health 
carrier] grievance, we would have our jobs back immediately.”13  Edith Lewin, BTF vice 
president and assistant to the president, also testified that the superintendent told the teachers 
they could all be rehired if only the union would agree to go to a single health insurance carrier 
and withdraw the grievance.14   
 The record also included the arbitration testimony of Sharon Alexander, an attendance 
teacher notified of her impending layoff.  Alexander testified that at a second level grievance 
meeting in the superintendent’s office, she asked him why the teachers were being laid off, to 
which he replied “if the union would go to a single health carrier provider, that he would hire us 
back immediately and he wanted the . . . the unions [sic] to drop the arbitration.”15   
  The BTF did not withdraw the single carrier grievance.  On August 24, 2005, the District 
laid off approximately 88 teachers.  On September 1, 2005, the District implemented the 
                                            
12 Joint Exhibit H. 
13 Joint Exhibit I, at p.132. 
14 Joint Exhibit K.  
15 Joint Exhibit J, at 139. 
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change to a single health insurance carrier. 
 The arbitrator issued an interim award in March 2006 in which he determined that the 
District violated the agreement by unilaterally implementing the resolution in question, and the 
arbitrator retained jurisdiction “to receive further evidence at additional hearings now 
scheduled to commence on April 11, 2006 and to determine what remedy, if any, is 
appropriate in this case.” 16   
 In October 2006, after the further proceedings referenced in the initial award, the 
arbitrator issued the award on the appropriate remedy.17  Based on the “unrefuted, mutually 
corroborating testimony” of the witnesses, the arbitrator found that “[a]ny doubts about the 
District’s coercive intent in issuing these letters [of July 29, 2005] or the arrogance of power 
exhibited therein is obviated.”18  The arbitrator found that the teachers were “laid off wrongfully, 
in furtherance of its ill-conceived effort to force the Union into submissive acceptance of the 
unilateral modification of [the agreement] which the District imposed, effective September 1, 
2005.”19  The arbitrator further explained that, “[i]n the final analysis, those pre-emptive lay-offs 
in anticipation of the predictable reversal of its unilateral contract modification by an impartial 
arbitrator seriously compounded the District’s culpability and liability in this case.”20 
  The arbitrator ordered that, effective January 1, 2007, the District rescind and cease the 
unilateral implementation of the resolution and “shall reinstate forthwith all teachers laid-off on 
September 1, 2005 . . . with seniority unimpaired, with ‘make whole’ monetary damages for 
back-pay and benefits from lay-off date to reinstatement date and with interest thereon 
                                            
16 Joint Exhibit L. 
17 Joint Exhibit M. 
18 Id., at p. 14. 
19 Id., at pp. 12-13. 
20 Id., at p. 13. 
Case No. U-26208  - 6 - 
 
 
calculated at the statutory judgment rate.”21  
 The BTF filed a proceeding to confirm the award, and the District filed a cross-petition to 
vacate.  Although the Supreme Court, Erie County confirmed the award in its totality, the 
Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed only as to the unilateral implementation of 
single carrier.  With respect to the remedy, the Court concluded that:  
 the arbitrator acted in excess of the power granted to him 
with respect to that part of the award concerning the 
teachers. . . . Here, article V (D) (4) (c) of the CBA provides 
in relevant part that “arbitrators shall limit their decisions 
strictly to the application and interpretation of the provisions 
of this contract, and shall be without power or authority to 
modify or amend it.” [The BTF] does not dispute that the 
CBA does not prohibit respondent from reducing its 
workforce, and we thus conclude that the arbitrator conferred 
a benefit on teachers to which they were not contractually 
entitled, i.e., a job security clause, and thereby modified the 
terms of the CBA in contravention of the explicitly 
enumerated limitation on his powers.22  
  
DISCUSSION 
 We have long held that an employer violates § 209-a.1(a) of the Act where its 
statements are “intended or likely to coerce employees to relinquish rights guaranteed by the 
Taylor Law.”23  In determining whether specific speech constitutes a violation we have looked 
to the specific context of the speech:    
Specifically with respect to employer speech, we have held 
that an employer may communicate directly with unit 
employees about employment issues so long as the 
communication does not contain threats of reprisal for their 
exercise of protected rights and does not promise them 
benefits for refraining from exercising those rights.  
 
In assessing whether any speech violates the Act, we reject 
                                            
21 Id., at p. 17. 
22 Buffalo Teachers Fedn, Inc v Board of Educ of City School Dist of City of Buffalo, 50 AD3d 
1503, 1506-1507 (4th Dept), lv. denied, 11 N.Y.3d 708 (2008). 
23 City of Albany, 17 PERB ¶ 3068, 3107 (1984). 
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the [ ] argument that the speaker’s subjective intent or the 
recipient's subjective reaction to it is relevant. The test for 
whether speech violates the Act is a purely objective one.  
With employer speech, we examine only whether a 
reasonable employee would view the speech as threatening 
or coercive in the context in which the speech is delivered.24 
  
 However, in applying that test the Board has also long “distinguished between a threat 
of retaliation because either a union or covered employees exercises protected rights and a 
statement that there might be layoffs if the exercise of protected rights results in cost increases 
for the employer.”25  In City of Albany, the Board acknowledged that “[t]his is a subtle 
distinction, but we conclude it is a sound one.”26   
 The July 29 letters “inform [the affected unit members] that the District does not 
anticipate being able to offer you an opportunity to work as a teacher in the coming school 
year.”  The statement is made, effectively, as announcing a determination that has already 
been made, and explains the reason leading to that decision.  Under City of Albany and its 
progeny, therefore, the July 29 letters do not violate the Act to the extent that they informed the 
affected employees of their anticipated layoff and the reasons underlying that layoff.  Similarly, 
the Superintendent’s statements, to the extent they addressed the layoffs and their cause, fall 
within the zone of protected employer speech.   
 However, that does not conclude our inquiry.  An employer’s representatives “are 
entitled to express opinions regarding the merits” of the subject at issue “so long as they do not 
                                            
24 Town of Greenburgh, 32 PERB ¶3025, 3054 (1999) (notes, citations and editing marks 
omitted). 
25 City of Albany, 17 PERB ¶ 3068, at 3106; City of Yonkers, 23 PERB ¶ 3055, 3116 (1990) 
see also Town of Greenburgh, 32 PERB ¶ 3025, at 3055 (“The expression of opinion alone is 
not unlawful even if the effect of that expression is to cause a grievance to be dropped or 
others never to be filed”). 
26 Id. 
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do so in a coercive manner nor subvert the authority of the [Union’s] negotiators.”27  In urging 
the affected employees to pressure the BTF to drop its grievance, the District’s letters and the 
Superintendent crossed both of those lines.  
 The stipulated record amply supports the conclusion that a reasonable employee would 
have viewed the written and spoken statements made on behalf of the District as coercive and 
as subverting the authority of the BTF in pursuing the grievance.   The July 29 letters and the 
unrefuted testimony explicitly linked the BTF’s grievance to the layoffs as cause and effect, 
and affected employees’ success in obtaining the BTF’s agreement to single carrier insurance 
to the rescission of the layoffs. 28     
 The District claims that the ALJ erred in finding that the July 26 letter and the August 5 
meeting as well as the subsequent layoffs were part of a “preconceived scheme designed to 
pressure the BTF to drop the single carrier grievance.”29  We agree in part.  The District 
properly relies on the fact that the July 29 letter establishes that the layoff decision was made 
prior to the August 5 meeting took place.  While this evidence is consistent with the ALJ’s 
finding as to the coercive and subversive effect of the July 29 letter and the August 5 meeting, 
it does not support the ALJ’s finding that the decision to excess the affected employees was 
made in bad faith.  Indeed, no evidence can be gleaned from the record that the decision to 
layoff the affected employees was made for any other than economic reasons predicated upon 
the District’s exposure from the grievance.  Even the offer of rehiring the excessed employees 
                                            
27 City of Albany, 17 PERB ¶ 3068, at 3106; Town of Huntington, 26 PERB ¶ 3073, 3140 
(1993); see also County of Monroe, 43 PERB ¶ 3025, 3097 (2010), confd sub nom Monroe Co 
v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 85 AD3d 1439 (3d Dept 2011). 
28 We note that the BTF in its response to exceptions specifically disavows any intention to 
plead or prove direct dealing (Response at ¶ 3; Brief in Support of Response at 10-11).  
Therefore we do not address whether the conduct at issue additionally constitutes direct 
dealing in violation of § 209-a(1) (a) and (d) of the Act.  
29 47 PERB ¶ 4501, at 4503. 
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upon the BTF’s withdrawal of the grievance is consistent with the rationale expressed in the 
July 29 letter and at the August 5 meeting that the decision to excess the affected employees 
resulted from the District’s recognition of its economic exposure from the grievance.   
 Our review of the record likewise does not find support for the ALJ’s finding that “the 
layoffs were directly intertwined with the letter of July 26, and the meeting and statements 
made by the superintendent on August 5, in that they were the final step in the preconceived 
scheme designed to pressure the BTF to drop the single carrier grievance,” and thus “they 
establish a violation of the Act.”30  Neither the stipulated facts nor the exhibits contain any 
factual support, even by indirect or circumstantial evidence, that the District’s decision to lay off 
the affected employees was based on any other reason than the financial exposure of the 
District resulting from the well-founded grievance predicated on what the arbitrator quite 
properly found to be a blatant breach of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement.  Indeed, 
as the arbitrator ultimately found, the “pre-emptive lay-offs” were “in anticipation of the 
predictable reversal of its unilateral contract modification by an impartial arbitrator.”31 
Accordingly, the ALJ erred in awarding reinstatement and back pay, because the unlawful 
conduct was not established to have a causal relationship to the losses that remedy was 
intended to redress.   
 Despite reversing this prong of the remedy, we do not mean to in any way condone the 
District’s unlawful acts here.  While the record does not establish that the decision to layoff 
affected employees was made in bad faith, the record does show a blatant attempt by the 
District to coerce the affected employees to act as its bargaining agents against the BTF, 
thereby subverting the BTF’s duly elected leadership, an act which is “inherently destructive of 
                                            
30 Id. 
31 Joint Exhibit M, at p. 13.  
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the rights of organization granted by § 202 of the Act.”32  Because of the unusual procedural 
posture of this case, in which the parties have repeatedly requested that we defer issuance of 
a decision pending the result of now-complete negotiations, resulting in the first collective 
bargaining agreement in over a decade, no remedial order other than the issuance of a cease 
and desist order is appropriate at this time to redress the fruits of the violation.   
 Based upon the foregoing, we find that the ALJ properly found on the record before her 
that the District had violated § 209-a.1(a) of the Act by making coercive statements and in 
promising benefits to BTF unit employees in exchange for their efforts to persuade the BTF to 
relinquish its statutory rights. 
Accordingly, the District is hereby ordered to forthwith: 
  1. Cease and desist from making statements to BTF unit employees intended to or 
having the effect of interfering with rights protected under the Act; 
2.  Sign and post the attached notice at all locations customarily used to communicate 
with BTF unit employees both in writing and electronically. 
DATED:  November 15, 2016 
               Albany, New York 
       
                                            
32 County of Monroe, 43 PERB ¶ 3025, at 3097. 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
 
 
we hereby notify all employees of the Buffalo City School District in the unit 
represented by the Buffalo Teachers Federation (BTF) that the District will: 
 
Not make statements to BTF unit employees intended to or having the effect of 
interfering with rights protected under the Act, to wit, that if employees would 
pressure the BTF to drop the single health carrier grievance they would be 
hired back immediately; and 
 
 
 
Dated . . . . . . . . . .  By  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   
on behalf of the Buffalo City School District 
                                                                
 
 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not  
be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
 
 
  STATE OF NEW YORK          
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
_________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC.,  
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, WESTCHESTER  
COUNTY LOCAL 860, UNIT 9200,  
 
Charging Party, 
 CASE NO. U-32413 
- and – 
 
COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER, 
 
Respondent. 
________________________________________ 
 
STEVEN A. CRAIN & DAREN RYLEWICZ, GENERAL COUNSELS (STEVEN 
A. CRAIN of counsel), for Charging Party 
 
ROBERT F. MEEHAN, COUNTY ATTORNEY (FREDERICK M. SULLIVAN of 
counsel), for Respondent 
 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of Westchester 
(County) to a decision and order of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).1  The ALJ held 
that the County violated §§ 209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Public Employees’ Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it abolished the position of Secretary I (Word Processor) in 
a collective bargaining unit represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Westchester County Local 860, Unit 9200 
(CSEA).  After a hearing, the ALJ concluded that the County would not have abolished 
the position if the incumbent and the local president, Karen Pecora, had not exercised 
her contractual right to full-time Employee Organization Leave (EOL), a protected right 
under the Act.  
 As a remedy, the ALJ directed the County: 
                                                     
1 47 PERB ¶ 4596 (2004). 
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-2- 
Not [to] consider Karen Pecora’s use of union leave time 
when considering positions that it will eliminate from its 
budget; [to] [r]reinstate Karen Pecora to her position as 
Secretary I (Word Processor) within the County’s 
Department of Parks, Recreation and Conservation; and [to] 
[m]ake Karen Pecora whole for lost wages and benefits, if 
any, suffered as a result of the elimination of her position 
from the County’s Department of Parks, Recreation and 
Conservation, with interest at the maximum legal rate.   
 
The ALJ also directed the County to sign and post a notice reflecting the remedial order 
at various locations used to communicate with unit employees.  For the reasons below, 
we affirm the ALJ’s finding of a violation of the Act, but modify her remedial order.  
EXCEPTIONS 
 The County’s 17 exceptions can be distilled into two arguments.  First, it argues 
that the ALJ erred in concluding that it abolished Pecora’s position because she was on 
EOL and by rejecting its argument that it abolished her position for legitimate budgetary 
reasons.  Second, assuming the finding of a violation is sustained, the County alleges 
that the ALJ erred in directing it to reinstate Pecora to her former position in the Parks 
Department.  The County asserts that CSEA’s successful contract grievance on the 
same subject has already made Pecora whole and relies on its compliance with the 
arbitrator’s order that Pecora “be reinstated to her former position of Secretary I, Salary 
Grade 7, or equivalent position, and be made whole for lost wages and/or benefits.”2  
Since it has complied with the award by restoring Pecora to a Secretary I, Salary Grade 
7 position in the Department of Social Services, the County argues that the ALJ should 
not have directed it to restore her position in the Parks Department.   
CSEA supports the ALJ’s decision and order in all respects.   
                                                     
2 Brief in Support of Exceptions at 14 (emphasis added) (quoting award of arbitrator, 
dated December 13, 2013 (Arbitration Award), attached thereto as Exhibit A, at p 17). 
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 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the ALJ’s decision to the extent that she 
found that the County’s abolition of Pecora’s position violated the Act, but we modify the 
remedial order.   
FACTS 
 Having carefully reviewed the full record, including the findings of fact made by 
the arbitrator regarding Pecora’s grievance contesting the abolition of her position, and 
the parties’ stipulations, we find that the ALJ accurately described the material events.  
Indeed, although the County challenges the ALJ’s conclusions and remedial order, it 
does not dispute her factual findings in any material respect.  
 The County hired Pecora in February 1990 as a receptionist in the Department of 
Parks Recreation and Conservation.  Nine years later, in 1999, she was promoted to 
Secretary I, also in the Parks Department.   
Pecora was elected as CSEA’s First Vice President in 2001, and elected as 
CSEA’s President in 2009.  The County approved Pecora to receive full-time EOL under 
Article XIII, §2 (A) (3) of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement, which provides, in 
relevant part: “The Unit President and Unit First Vice-President and two (2) other Unit 
employees appointed by the Unit President and subject to the County’s approval shall, 
at all times, be free of assigned duties.”  Thus, while Pecora provided secretarial 
services for the Parks Department as a Secretary I between 1999 and 2001, she was 
on full-time EOL and provided no such services from 2001 until the elimination of her 
position by the County. 
While Pecora was on full time EOL, her position as a Secretary I in the Parks 
Department was abolished by the County effective December 31, 2012, as part of a 
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budget reduction plan for 2013.  Because Pecora did not have “bumping rights” to other 
positions, she was terminated from employment.  Shortly thereafter, Pecora was hired 
by the County’s Board of Elections on January 7, 2013, as an Intermediate File Clerk, a 
position included in CSEA’s unit but that pays a lower salary than Pecora earned in her 
prior position as a Secretary I, Grade 7.3   
 Kathleen O’Connor, Commissioner of the Parks Department since 2011, is 
responsible for developing the Department’s budget, including the identification of 
positions for elimination, subject to final approval by the County’s Board of Legislators.   
She testified that she first proposed eliminating Pecora’s position in 2011, pursuant to 
the County’s 2012 budget reduction requirements.  That proposal was submitted to the 
Board of Legislators, which restored Pecora’s position in the 2012 budget.  In 2012, the 
County again required O’Connor to cut her budget for the 2013 year.  O’Connor again 
submitted a budget eliminating Pecora’s position.  She testified that she proposed 
cutting Pecora’s position in 2013 because the Parks Department’s need for secretarial 
services had diminished over the years due to the elimination of Deputy Commissioner 
positions, of which only one remained.  Although there is no evidence that Pecora had 
been assigned clerical duties for a Deputy Commissioner, O’Connor testified that 
eliminating Pecora’s position would be the least painful to the Department.  The parties 
stipulated that since 2011, when O’Connor became Commissioner, the Parks 
Department abolished 7 clerical positions for budgetary reasons after the incumbents 
retired.  O’Connor explained that she eliminated Pecora’s position because it was no 
                                                     
3  The Board of Elections did not approve Pecora for full-time EOL.  Therefore, she 
provided part-time work as a Clerk for the Board of Elections and had part-time EOL 
until she lost her bid to be CSEA’s President in 2013 for a term commencing June 30 of 
that year.   
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longer needed.  However, the  the same clerical functions that Pecora would have 
performed if she had not been on full-time EOL were in fact being performed by two 
retired employees who had been rehired on a part-time basis shortly after their 
retirement.4  Nevertheless, O’Connor testified that her decision to eliminate Pecora’s 
position had nothing to do with who occupied it, and the record reveals no animus on 
O’Connor’s part against Pecora because of her contractual EOL position.     
 Following the County’s abolition of Pecora’s position in the Parks Department 
and Pecora’s termination from employment, CSEA filed and pursued to arbitration a 
contract grievance alleging that the County’s action breached the EOL term in Article 
XIII, § 2 (A) (3).  By Opinion and Award dated December 13, 2013, the arbitrator 
sustained CSEA’s grievance.  Emphasizing that the County could properly eliminate 
positions performing functions that the County no longer required, for example where 
the position was included in a department that was abolished, the arbitrator held that the 
County could not eliminate positions performing services that the County needed simply 
because the incumbent was absent due to the use of contractual EOL.   
 Based largely on the record created before the ALJ, the arbitrator found that the 
clerical functions associated with Pecora’s position had not been eliminated, but were 
being performed by the two recently retired part-time employees.  According to that 
record, the following colloquy took place: 
 
Q.  I mean isn’t the fact that Karen been working as a secretary in 
your department all along once Regina and Nancy retired, some of 
                                                     
4 Tr, at p. 112, 114-115, 116 (Nancy Roach, retired in 2009); 115-116 (Regina 
Birkenstock, date of retirement unspecified).  By hiring the part-time employees, the 
County obtained a significant savings because, as part-time employees, they were not 
entitled to certain benefits, including medical benefits. 
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those duties would have been assigned to Karen? 
A.  Possibility. 
Q.  That is possible, correct? 
A.  Possible. 
Q.  And if she was then performing these duties, perhaps she 
wouldn’t have been laid off, correct? 
A.  Possible.5 
 
When asked why these recently retired employees were rehired on a part-time 
basis, O’Connor testified that they possessed institutional memory and experience 
within the Parks Department that Pecora lacked because she had been on full-time EOL 
since 2001.  Finally, the arbitrator found it telling that since 2011 the Parks Department 
had eliminated seven clerical positions for budgetary reasons after the incumbents 
retired.  In contrast, the arbitrator emphasized that while Pecora’s position was vacant 
because she was on EOL, Pecora was the only clerical employee who was affirmatively 
laid off.  To the arbitrator, the County’s decision to lay Pecora off, unlike the positions 
that it abolished after they became vacant, while rehiring retirees to perform the clerical 
work that Pecora would have performed had she not been on full-time EOL was 
indicative “of bad faith.”6  The arbitrator concluded that by abolishing Pecora’s position 
because it was vacant, albeit fully funded, the County effectively nullified the contractual 
EOL rights.   
 To remedy the County’s breach of contract, the arbitrator directed that Pecora 
“be reinstated to her former position of Secretary I, Salary Grade 7, or equivalent 
position, and be made whole due to lost wages and/or benefits of the difference she 
earned in the County’s Board of Elections and what she would have earned if she 
                                                     
5 Tr., at p. 117. 
6 Arbitration Award at 16. 
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remained continuously employed in her former position of Secretary I, salary grade 7.”7   
The County has fully complied with the arbitrator’s award.   
 Based on substantially the same facts on which the arbitrator relied, and for the 
same reasons, the ALJ held that the County would not have abolished Pecora’s position 
and laid her off “but for” her use of contractual EOL, a protected activity well known to 
the County.  The ALJ rejected the County’s claim that its decision was predicated on 
legitimate economic grounds, finding the County’s explanation that it no longer needed 
the work was pretextual, noting, as well, that the only clerical positions that the County 
eliminated since 2011 were vacant positions owing to the incumbents’ retirement.    
Therefore, the ALJ held that the County violated §§ 209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act.  As a 
remedy, the ALJ ordered the County not to consider employees’ use of EOL in making 
decisions to eliminate positions; that Pecora be reinstated to her former position with the 
Parks Department; that the County make Pecora whole for lost wages and benefits plus 
interest, and directed the County to post a notice reflecting her remedial order, whereas 
the Arbitrator ordered no similar posting.  
DISCUSSION 
 The dispute presented here is not unique.  In County of Nassau,8 the employer 
abolished a position where the incumbent was on full-time EOL under the terms of the 
parties’ collective bargaining agreement.  In finding a violation, the Board observed:    
The issue before us is easily stated: Did the County 
eliminate [an employee’s] position because [the employee] 
used EOL or did it do so, as it claims, only because 
budgetary constraints forced that decision? If the former, the 
                                                     
7 Id at 17. 
8 27 PERB ¶ 3011, at 3022 (1994), confd sub nom. County of Nassau v New York State 
Pub Empl Relations Bd, 221 AD2d 339, 28 PERB ¶ 7014 (2d Dept 1995).  
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County's action violated both § 209-a.1(a) and (c) because 
the elimination of a position for that reason discriminates 
against [an employee] individually for the exercise of clear 
contract rights [citing County of Albany, 25 PERB ¶ 3026 
(1992)] and interferes with [that] and all other employees' 
participation in protected union activities. . ..  [A] position 
eliminated for this reason necessarily suggests to employees 
that there may be adverse employment-related 
consequences for either membership or active participation 
in a union or for securing to oneself the benefits of the 
collective bargaining agreement. [citing Hudson Valley 
Community College, 18 PERB ¶ 3057 (1985)] Alternatively, a 
position’s abolition for economic reasons does not violate 
either § 209-a.1(a) or (c) of the Act even though the 
occupant of that position is a union officer, activist, or agent. 
The Act does not insulate union officers of any type or at any 
level from the adverse effects of an employer's properly 
motivated managerial decisions. [citing State of New 
York(Unified Court System), 26 PERB ¶ 3046 (1993)] The 
Act ensures that employees are not interfered with, 
discriminated against or improperly advantaged in their 
employment relationship because of their decisions with 
respect to union membership, office or participation.9   
 
In that case, the record showed that the employer’s decision was predicated on the cost 
savings it would obtain by eliminating the funded, non-productive position; that is, it 
eliminated the position because the employee exercised his protected contractual right 
to EOL, a violation of §§ 209-a.1 (a) and (c).   
 In finding a lack of malice on the part of O’Connor, we note the incongruity of the 
County’s requiring the Parks Department to bear in its budget the cost of the County’s 
contractual obligation to provide a full-time EOL position while at the same time 
requiring the Parks Department to reduce that budget.  Consistent with County of 
Nassau, however, we have long held that malice is “not an essential element of a 
                                                     
9 Id. 
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violation of § 209-a.1(a), (b) or (c) of the [Act].”10  Rather, where the record does not 
support the conclusion “that the [employer] would have eliminated [the employee’s] 
position even if [the employee] had not used the contractual leave,” an ALJ’s finding of a 
violation of the Act will be upheld.11  
This is not to say that employees on EOL are per se exempt from generally 
applicable policies or from decisions made under such policies.  For example, a 
generally applicable policy denying overtime to “employees on extended leave of 
various types regardless of purpose” does not violate the Act as long as the policy is 
applied consistently and in a non-discriminatory manner.12      
 Here, we find, as did the ALJ and the arbitrator, that the County abolished 
Pecora’s position and laid her off because it obtained no benefit by continuing to fund 
the position.  As was the case in County of Nassau, the precipitating factor in the 
selection of Pecora for layoff was her “use of EOL because [s]he was not of use to the 
Department in that capacity.” 13  Although the decision was economic, and not the result 
of animus or spite, as the County argues, the lack of any productive benefit from 
Pecora’s position was owing entirely to Pecora’s exercise of her protected, contractual 
right to EOL.  This is borne out by the fact that the City did not eliminate the functions 
associated with Pecora’s position, but rather continued to have those functions 
performed by other employees.   Thus, we find, as did the ALJ and the arbitrator, that 
Pecora’s position would not have been eliminated and she terminated if she had not 
exercised her protected contractual right to EOL.  The County had not eliminated a filled 
                                                     
10 Rochester City School Dist, 10 PERB ¶ 3097, 3167 (1977). 
11 County of Nassau, 27 PERB ¶ 3011, at 3023. 
12 State of New York (Unified Court System), 26 PERB ¶ 3046, 3080 (1993). 
13 County of Nassau, 27 PERB ¶ 3011, at 3023. 
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Parks Department clerical position since 2011, other than Pecora’s, showing disparate 
treatment.    
Each of the County’s additional arguments to the ALJ in defense of its conduct, 
reiterated in its exceptions to us, was raised to and rejected by the arbitrator for the 
same reasons that the ALJ rejected them.  We similarly reject them here for the same 
reasons.   
 In reaching our conclusion, we reject the County’s argument that the abolition of 
Pecora’s position cannot violate §§ 209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act because the decision 
was, ultimately, a legislative action.  Not only did O’Connor testify that it was she who 
determined whether to abolish the position, but, as the Board explained in County of 
Suffolk Legislature, “legislative bodies often act in an executive capacity,” and “[w]hen 
so acting, legislative bodies are equally subject to the proscriptions of the Act.”14  Such 
is the case here, where the County Legislature has adopted a proposed budget that 
abolishes a single position, selected for abolition based upon the protected status of the 
incumbent.15 
We also reject the County’s exception to the ALJ’s ruling at the hearing to accept 
the parties’ collective bargaining agreement into the record.  The County offers no 
argument in support of this exception and we find none apparent from the record.          
 Finally, we affirm the ALJ’s conclusion that Pecora’s position would not have 
                                                     
14 34 PERB ¶ 3034, 3080 (2001), confd sub nom Suffolk Co. Legislature v Cuevas, 303 
AD2d 415, 36 PERB ¶ 7006 (2d Dept 2003); see also, Town of Tuscarora, 45 PERB ¶ 
3044, 3112 (2012) (improper practice charge claiming that Town Board’s adoption of 
budget that abolished position of employee based on protected activity stated claim 
under the Act); see generally County of Suffolk and Suffolk County Legislature, 15 
PERB ¶ 3021 (1982). 
15 Town of Tuscarora, 45 PERB ¶ 3044, at 3112; County of Suffolk Legislature, 34 
PERB ¶ 3034, 3080.  
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been abolished and she terminated “but for” her exercise of her protected contractual 
right to EOL in violation of §§ 209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act.  We have long held that 
“[c]redibility determinations by an ALJ are generally entitled to ‘great weight unless there 
is objective evidence in the record compelling a conclusion that the credibility finding is 
manifestly incorrect.’”16  Here, no such objective evidence demonstrating that the ALJ's 
credibility determinations are manifestly incorrect has been adduced, and we therefore 
will not reverse them.    
 On the question of the remedy, our remedial authority under § 205.5 (d) of the 
Act, as relevant here, is “to issue a decision and order directing an offending party to 
cease and desist from any improper practice, and to take such affirmative action as will 
effectuate the policies of [the Act].”  Where appropriate, we are authorized to direct “the 
reinstatement of employees with or without back pay.”  In addition, we require the 
posting of a notice reflecting the order to advise employees in the affected bargaining 
unit of their rights under the Act.  Our “make whole” orders effectuate the policies of the 
Act by restoring, as nearly as possible, the status quo ante.  Thus, while our orders of 
reinstatement with back pay may inure to the private benefit of the affected employees, 
it remains that our orders are necessarily designed to vindicate the public interest by 
effectuating the policies of the Act.17  By contrast, the arbitrator’s award at issue here is 
fundamentally to enforce the parties’ collective bargaining agreement, and his remedial 
                                                     
16 Elwood Teachers Alliance (Neithardt), 48 PERB ¶ 3020, text at n. 40, citing 
Village of Endicott, 47 PERB ¶ 3017, 3051 (2014) (quoting Manhasset Union Free Sch 
Dist, 41 PERB ¶ 3005, at 3019 (2008), citing County of Tioga, 44 PERB ¶ 3016, at 3062 
(2011); Mount Morris Cent Sch Dist, 41 PERB ¶ 3020 (2008); City of Rochester, 23 
PERB ¶ 3049 (1990); Hempstead Housing Auth, 12 PERB ¶ 3054 (1979); Captain's 
Endowment Assn, 10 PERB ¶ 3034 (1977)). 
17 Cf, Union Free Sch Dist No. 6 of Towns of Islip & Smithtown v New York State 
Human Rights Appeal Bd, 35 NY2d 371, 380 (1974).   
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authority extends no further than the authority that the parties agree to confer upon him.  
Accordingly, the arbitrator’s award neither defines nor limits our remedial authority 
under the Act.     
 The County argues that the ALJ should not have ordered Pecora reinstated “to 
her position as Secretary I (Word Processor) within the County’s Department of Parks, 
Recreation and Conservation,” but that she should have adopted the arbitrator’s award 
which permitted it to reinstate Pecora “to her former position of Secretary I, Salary 
Grade 7, or equivalent position.”18  It is undisputed that the County has complied with 
the arbitrator’s order by reinstating Pecora with back pay to a Secretary I, Salary Grade 
7 position in its Department of Social Services.  The County contends that it should not 
be required to reinstate her to the same position in the Parks Department.  CSEA’s 
position in response is that she should be restored to a position in the Parks 
Department because that is where her former position was.   
 Provided that the County complies with all other elements of the ALJ’s remedial 
order, we find that the policies of the Act are sufficiently effectuated by the County’s 
reinstatement of Pecora to a Secretary I, Salary Grade 7 position in the Department of 
Social Services.  We note that CSEA offers no basis to conclude that such a 
reinstatement has prejudiced Pecora in any way, whereas requiring the County to 
remove Pecora from her current position as Secretary I, Salary Grade 7 in the 
Department of Social Services and restoring her to a like position in the Parks 
Department would necessarily cause disruption to the current status quo as defined by 
the arbitrator’s award, implemented over two years ago.  We further note that the 
                                                     
18 Arbitration Award at p 17 (emphasis added). 
Case No. U-32413 
 
 
-13- 
arbitrator’s award was issued in a proceeding that CSEA successfully pursued at the 
same time that it pursued the instant improper practice proceeding.  Indeed, the record 
of the improper practice proceeding formed the basis of the record before the arbitrator.  
The arbitrator and the ALJ reached the same factual conclusions, and each ordered that 
Pecora be reinstated to her former position of Secretary I, Salary Grade 7.  Although the 
arbitrator’s award permitted the County to reinstate Pecora to “an equivalent position,” 
the County reinstated her to the very position she previously held, albeit in the 
Department of Social Services.   Under the circumstances present here, we find that is 
sufficient.    
Accordingly, as limited by the facts and circumstances of the instant matter, 
particularly the issuance of an arbitrator’s award that parallels, in all material respects, 
what we conclude to be an adequate remedy, the County is hereby ordered to:  
1. Not consider use of union leave time when considering positions that it will 
eliminate from its budget;   
 
2. To the extent, if any, not already effectuated by the arbitrator’s award, make Karen 
Pecora whole for lost wages and benefits, if any, suffered as a result of the 
elimination of her position from the County’s Department of Parks, Recreation and 
Conservation, with interest at the maximum legal rate; and  
 
3. Sign and post the attached notice at all physical and electronic locations 
customarily used to communicate with unit employees.  
 
DATED:  November 15, 2016 
               Albany, New York 
 
 NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
 
we hereby notify all employees of the County of Westchester (County) in the unit represented by 
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Westchester County 
Local 860, Unit 9200 that the County will forthwith:   
 
 
1. Not consider use of union leave time when considering positions that it will 
eliminate from its budget; and 
 
2. To the extent, if any, not already effectuated by the arbitrator’s award, make 
Karen Pecora whole for lost wages and benefits, if any, suffered as a result of the 
elimination of her position from the County’s Department of Parks, Recreation 
and Conservation, with interest at the maximum legal rate.  
 
 
 
 
Dated . . . . . . . . . .  By  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
on behalf of the COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be 
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.  
 
 
 STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
_______________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
COUNTY OF MADISON and MADISON COUNTY  
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HANCOCK ESTABROOK, LLP (JOHN F. CORCORAN, ESQ. of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
 
JOHN M. CROTTY, ESQ., for Respondent 
 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 This case comes to us on exceptions to a decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) finding that the Madison County Deputy Sheriff’s Police Benevolent 
Association, Inc. (PBA) violated § 209-a.2 (b) of the Public Employees’ Fair 
Employment Relations Act (Act).1  The ALJ found that the PBA violated the Act by 
submitting to compulsory interest arbitration certain proposals that are not arbitrable 
under § 209.4(g) of the Act.   
EXCEPTIONS 
 The PBA excepts to the ALJ’s decisions on three grounds.  First, the PBA 
asserts that the ALJ erred in finding non-arbitrable the PBA’s demand that an employee 
on disciplinary suspension receive pay after thirty days.  The PBA’s second exception 
contends that the ALJ erred in finding non-arbitrable its demand for an increased 
amount of compensatory time provided an employee in lieu of overtime pay.  Finally, the 
                                                          
1 48 PERB ¶ 4514 (2015).   
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PBA claims that the ALJ erred in finding non-arbitral the demand allowing it to grieve the 
Sheriff’s denial of an employee’s request for an education stipend based on the Sheriff’s 
determination that a college degree is not job related.   
 For the following reasons, we affirm the ALJ’s decision. 
DISCUSSION 
 Section 209.4 (g) of the Act limits the availability of interest arbitration for 
“members of any organized unit of deputy sheriffs who: (1) are engaged directly in 
criminal law enforcement activities that aggregate more than” 50 % of their service, and 
(2) are encompassed within the definition of “police officers” pursuant to § 1.20 (34) of 
the Criminal Procedure Law, with certification requirements for both qualifications.  For 
such employees, inclusive of the unit members at issue here, interest arbitration: 
shall only apply to the terms of collective bargaining 
agreements directly relating to compensation, including, but 
not limited to, salary, stipends, location pay, insurance, 
medical and hospitalization benefits; and shall not apply to 
non-compensatory issues including, but not limited to, job 
security, disciplinary procedures and actions, deployment or 
scheduling, or issues relating to eligibility for overtime 
compensation which shall be governed by other provisions 
[prescribed] by law.  
 
 In construing this language, the Board has repeatedly reaffirmed the test for 
determining whether a particular demand is directly related to compensation, and 
therefore arbitrable under § 209.4 (g) of the Act, first articulated in New York State 
Police: 
The degree of a demand's relationship to compensation is 
measured by the characteristic of the demand. If the sole, 
predominant or primary characteristic of the demand is 
compensation, then it is arbitrable because the demand to 
that extent directly relates to compensation. A demand has 
compensation as its sole, predominant or primary 
characteristic only when it seeks to effect some change in 
amount or level of compensation by either payment from the 
State to or on behalf of an employee or the modification of 
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an employee's financial obligation arising from the 
employment relationship (e.g., a change in an insurance 
copayment).  If the effect is otherwise, then the relationship 
of the demand becomes secondary and indirect and the 
subject is, therefore, excluded from the scope of compulsory 
arbitration under the language of § 209.4 [g].2 
 
 As the Board further explained in County of Orange: 
Under that test, each proposal must be examined separately 
to discern whether its sole, predominant or primary 
characteristic is a modification in the amount or level of 
compensation. Consistent with State Police, in applying that 
test, we will compare a proposal with the subjects 
specifically identified by the Legislature as being arbitrable: 
“salary, stipends, location pay, insurance, medical and 
hospitalization benefits.” In addition, we will compare the 
proposal with those subjects declared by the Legislature to 
be nonarbitrable: “job security, disciplinary procedures and 
actions, deployment or scheduling, or issues relating to 
eligibility for overtime compensation.”3   
 
 In the instant case, the PBA challenges the ALJ’s ruling that three specific 
demands were not “directly related to compensation” and thus not arbitrable under § 
209.4(g) of the Act.  We address them in turn. 
Demand No. 1: Limiting Suspension Without Pay 
 In its Demand No. 1, the PBA seeks to amend § 11.2 of the parties’ collective 
bargaining agreement to “[c]larify that an employee cannot be suspended without pay 
for a period in excess of thirty (30) calendar days when served with a notice of 
discipline.”4 As the PBA concedes, a substantially identical demand was found by the 
                                                          
2 30 PERB ¶ 3013, 3028 (1997), confd sub nom New York State Police Investigators 
Assn v NYS Pub Empl Rel Bd, 30 PERB ¶ 7011 (Sup Ct Albany County 1997) 
(emphasis in original); see also County of Broome, 44 PERB ¶ 3046, 3137 (2011). 
3 44 PERB ¶ 3023, (2011). 
4 Amended Charge, Ex. 3, at 2, Demand No. 5. Because of the resolution of various of 
the demands at issue prior to the issuance of the ALJ’s decision, the numbering of the 
demands provided in ALJ’s opinion differs from that of the exhibit in the record, which is, 
as the ALJ notes, agreed to be accurate.   48 PERB ¶ 4514, at 4550.  For the purpose 
of clarity, we use the ALJ’s numbering in the text of the opinion, while providing a 
citation to the original in the notes. 
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Board to be non-arbitrable in a prior case involving the same parties, in County of 
Madison.5  As the board explained in that earlier decision: 
While the proposal would change the amount or level of 
compensation of an employee suspended without pay at the 
time he or she is served with a notice of discipline, the issue 
of compensation in the proposal is inextricably intertwined 
with the contractual disciplinary procedures, a nonarbitrable 
subject under § 209.4(g) of the Act.6 
  
 In this case, as in the prior iteration of the identic demand found to be non-
arbitrable, the PBA sought to amend Section 11, entitled “Discipline,” of the parties’ 
collective bargaining agreement (Agreement), which provides for disciplinary penalties 
and procedures, though not predicates.7   
 Although not clearly stated in our prior decision involving this same demand, it is 
beyond peradventure that suspension without pay is a disciplinary action.8  The 
statutory exclusion from interest arbitration of demands including “disciplinary 
procedures and actions” would on a plain meaning reading of the statute render this 
demand non-arbitrable.9  Indeed, the parties’ own understanding, as reflected in the 
Agreement, is consistent with our reading of the statutory exclusion’s scope; § 11.1 of 
                                                          
5 44 PERB ¶ 3035, 3117 (2011).  
6 County of Madsion, 44 PERB ¶ 3035, at 3117. 
7 Amended Charge, Ex 1, at 7. 
8  See, eg, Lovejoy–Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 223–24 (2d 
Cir.2001); New York City Transit Auth, 35 PERB ¶ 3029, confd sub nom. NYC Transit 
Auth v. NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd,, 196 Misc.2d 532 (Sup Ct Kings Co. 2003), affd, 
27 AD3d 11 (2d Dept 2005), revd, 8 N.Y.3d 226 (2007). 
9 At a minimum, the statutory language excluding “disciplinary procedures and actions” 
obviates the PBA’s effort to analogize the instant demand to City of White Plains, 12 
PERB ¶ 3046 (1979), in which the Board found negotiable a demand that an employee 
could not be suspended without pay upon services of disciplinary charges, as Civil 
Service Law § 75 did not preclude such negotiations.  First, the inquiry as to what is a 
mandatory subject of bargaining under the Act is wholly distinct from whether such a 
demand falls within the drastically more limited scope of subjects eligible for interest 
arbitration under § 209.4(g).  Moreover, while the PBA is technically correct that “[t]he 
statute does not use the word ‘discipline,’” (Brief in Support of Exceptions at 7), the 
analogy founders on the express exclusion from interest arbitration of “disciplinary 
procedures and actions.”  
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the Agreement provides that “[d]isciplinary action shall include, but is not limited to, 
written reprimands, suspension, demotion, discharge, fines, or any combination thereof, 
or other such penalties as may be imposed by the Sheriff.”10   
 However, we do not rely solely on a plain meaning reading of the text here.  The 
demand would limit the duration of suspensions and eliminate their economic effect 
beyond the 30-day maximum length of such a suspension without pay.  In other words, 
the demand seeks to change not merely the compensation of the employees affected, 
but also the nature of one form of disciplinary action expressly provided for in the 
Agreement.11  We adhere to the Board’s prior ruling that the demand is at a minimum 
inextricably intertwined with “disciplinary procedures and actions” excluded from interest 
arbitration by § 209.4(g), and is thus non-arbitrable.12    
Demand No. 2: Increase Limit of Banked Compensatory Time 
 Demand No. 2, seeks to “[i]nsert eighty (80) where sixty (60) appear in the 
following contract provision: ‘Employees may not bank more than sixty (60) hours of 
compensatory time at any given time.”13  The PBA candidly acknowledges that the ALJ 
was obliged to find this demand non-arbitrable under the Board’s decision in County of 
Orange,14 but argues that we should reverse that decision, and that State Police, upon 
which the Board relied in County of Orange, should be distinguished, or, if not 
                                                          
10 Id. (emphasis added). 
11 County of Suffolk, 40 PERB ¶ 3022, 3088-3089 (2007). 
12 County of Madison, 44 PERB ¶ 3035, at 3117.  As we endorse the Board’s prior 
holding on the merits, we need not address the County’s arguments based on res 
judicata.  We note, as we have previously stated, strict application of New York or 
federal civil practice precedent may be inappropriate due to the distinct procedures in 
the Rules along with the public policy underlying the Act, and declined to blanketly 
apply [res judicata] as governing [in] all circumstances, while also allowing that under 
appropriate circumstances, res judicata and collateral estoppel may constitute 
appropriate bases for dismissing a charge.”  County of Nassau, 49 PERB ¶ 3014, 3057, 
n. 20 (2016) (citations, quotation marks, and editing marks omitted). 
13 Amended Charge, Ex. 3, at 4, Demand No. 6, amending Agreement § 13.2.4. 
14 44 PERB ¶ 3023 (2011). 
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distinguishable, overruled in part.   
 In County of Orange, the Board reaffirmed that: 
a unitary demand that includes leave accumulation and 
compensation to unit members for unused leave does not 
satisfy the arbitrability test under State Police. A demand 
that includes an inseparable component calling for an 
increase in leave accumulation cannot be characterized as 
being solely, predominantly or primarily related to increasing 
the level or amount of compensation under State Police.15   
 
 The instant demand poses the same problem as that found to be excluded from 
compulsory arbitration in County of Orange; it requests an increase not in the amount of 
compensation, but in the ability to store up leave which, if not used, could then be 
monetized.  As the Board explained in State Police, a subject is directly related to 
compensation “only when it seeks to effect some change in amount or level of 
compensation by either payment from the State to or on behalf of an employee or the 
modification of an employee's financial obligation arising from the employment 
relationship.”16  Here, the demand does not change the amount of leave an employee 
can earn, and thus either use or monetize; it relates solely to the amount of leave that 
be accumulated at any one time.  In other words, the demand relates to the time at 
which accumulated leave must be paid out or used, and not to the amount of leave an 
employee can earn.17  Thus, the demand’s “sole, predominant or primary characteristic” 
is not to “effect some change in amount or level of compensation,” but to change the 
frequency with which such leave must be used or paid out.18  As such, the demand is 
not directly related to compensation. 
                                                          
15 44 PERB ¶ 3023, at 3081. 
16 30 PERB ¶ 3013, at 3028. 
17 For this reason, we need not address the PBA’s argument that we should revisit the 
holding of State Police and find that a demand for an increase in the amount of paid 
leave time that an employee could earn should be found to be arbitrable.   
18 30 PERB ¶ 3013, at 3028. 
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Demand No. 5: Grievance Review of Sheriff’s Determination  
as to Eligibility for Educational Allowance Benefit 
 
 The final demand at issue seeks to “[d]elete in its entirety” § 40.3 of the 
Agreement.19  Section 40.1 provides for an educational allowance to be provided to 
“[f]ull-time employees who have completed at least one (1) year of continuous service 
and who possess an academic degree in the field of criminal justice, law enforcement, 
political science, or a closely related field.”20  Section 40.3 provides that the “Sheriff 
shall determine if the degree is job related, and such determination shall not be subject 
to the grievance procedure specified in Section 9 of this Agreement.”  Thus, as the note 
accompanying the demand specifies, the demand “[r]efers to [the] determination not 
being subject to the Grievance Procedure.”21  
 The Board’s prior decisions in County of Putnam22 and County of Sullivan23 both 
found that demands regarding procedures to contest adverse determinations by an 
employer as to eligibility for benefits were not directly related to compensation, because, 
as the Board explained in Sullivan County, “the proposal primarily deals with the 
procedure and not with compensation.”24  The PBA does not dispute that, under these 
decisions, the demand is non-arbitrable; rather, it contends that these holdings of 
Putnam and Sullivan should be overruled.   
 In support of its argument, it relies on the more recent decision of the Board in 
County of Tompkins.25  In that case, the Board found non-arbitrable a unitary demand 
that encompassed procedures “not directly related to whether a unit member is eligible 
                                                          
19 Amended Charge, Ex. 3 at 8, Demand No. 18. 
20 Amended Complaint, Ex. 1, at 39.   
21 Amended Charge, Ex. 3 at 8, Demand No. 18. 
22 38 PERB ¶ 3013, 3106 (2005). 
23 39 PERB ¶ 3034, 3112 (2006). 
24 Id. 
25 44 PERB ¶ 3024 (2011). 
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to receive, or to continue to receive, monetary benefits pursuant to G[eneral] M[unicipal] 
L[aw] § 207-c.”26  In the same decision, however, the Board found arbitrable a health 
insurance buy-out proposal.  As the Board explained its reasoning: 
The primary and predominant characteristic of this proposal 
is to increase the level of compensation for unit employees 
based upon declination and waiver of employer health 
insurance coverage, and the conversion of that benefit into 
compensation. Following a declination and waiver, the 
employee is eligible to receive additional compensation 
under a formula set forth in the proposal. In addition, the 
proposal would allow an employee to terminate receipt of the 
additional compensation through a request to re-establish 
health care coverage. While there are components of the 
proposal that are procedural in nature, those procedures 
directly relate to whether a unit employee is eligible for an 
increase or decrease in the level of compensation.27 
 
 The PBA reads this passage as an implicit repudiation of the holdings of County 
of Sullivan and County of Putnam that all procedural demands are not directly related to 
compensation.  We do not find Tompkins inconsistent with Sullivan or Putnam, as none 
of these cases speaks in such categorical terms.  In Sullivan County the Board 
expressly stated that a proposal limited to procedures to contest adverse determinations 
by an employer as to eligibility for benefits was not directly related to compensation 
because “the proposal primarily deals with the procedure and not with compensation.”28   
 The ALJ correctly found the instant case to be more analogous to Putnam 
County, and, especially, Sullivan County, than to Tompkins County.  In Tompkins 
County, “[t]he primary and predominant characteristic of this proposal [was] to increase 
the level of compensation for unit employees based upon declination and waiver of 
employer health insurance coverage, and the conversion of that benefit into 
                                                          
26 Id at 3088. 
27 Id. 
28 39 PERB ¶ 3034, at 3112 (emphasis added). 
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compensation.”29  The Board found in that case that the procedural components of the 
demand were merely incidental to that demand.  Here, however, as in Sullivan County 
and in Putnam County, the proposal deals in its entirety with procedure and not with the 
level of compensation.    
 Accordingly, we affirm the ALJ’s findings that the PBA violated § 209-a.2(b) of 
the Act by submitting Demand No.1, Demand No. 2, and Demand No. 5 to interest 
arbitration, and affirm in full the ALJ’s remedial order.  
DATED:  November 15, 2016 
       Albany, New York 
 
 
 
    
 
                                                          
29 44 PERB ¶ 3024, at 3088. 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 This case comes to us on exceptions filed by both the Charging Party, the City of 
Ithaca (City) and the Respondent, the Ithaca Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (PBA), 
to a decision and order of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).1   The ALJ dismissed the 
City’s charge that the PBA violated § 209-a.2 (b) of the Public Employees’ Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it declined to negotiate with the City for a successor 
agreement with a starting date of January 1, 2014.  
EXCEPTIONS 
 The City excepts to the ALJ’s decision on, essentially, two grounds.  First, the 
City contends that the ALJ erred in finding that the PBA’s refusal to consent to 
compulsory interest arbitration did not result in the imposition of the status quo for the 
two years that would have been addressed by the interest arbitration award.  Second, 
                                                     
1 48 PERB ¶ 4568 (2015). 
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the City asserts that the ALJ erred in finding that the PBA did not violate its duty to 
bargain in good faith by demanding to negotiate a successor agreement covering the 
same two years that an interest arbitration award would have covered after the PBA 
refused to consent to interest arbitration, thus electing to extend the terms of the expired 
agreement. 
 The PBA excepts to the ALJ’s decision, claiming that the ALJ erred in reaching 
the merits of the City’s charge, as to both the City’s claims.2  As to the merits of the 
PBA’s position on the duration of a successor the agreement, the PBA asserts that the 
ALJ should have found that the PBA was engaged in bargaining and/or a protected 
expression of opinion.  Moreover, the PBA contends that the ALJ erred in allowing the 
City to collaterally challenge the Director of Conciliation’s decision to not process the 
City’s petition for interest arbitration.  Rather, the PBA argues, the ALJ erred by “not 
addressing the PBA’s threshold arguments for dismissal of the City’s charge.”3     
 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the ALJ’s decision.  
FACTS 
 The parties presented this matter to the ALJ on a stipulated record consisting of 
the charge and the exhibits annexed to the charge, and the answer.  Accordingly, the 
material facts are not in dispute, and are presented here based upon that stipulated 
record. 
 On or about March 8, 2012, the PBA and the City began negotiations for a 
successor to the January 1, 2008 through December 31, 2011 collectively negotiated 
agreement between them.  The PBA filed a declaration of impasse on or about July 10, 
                                                     
2 PBA Exceptions, Nos. 1, 2. 
3 Id., at No. 3. 
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2013.  A mediator was appointed and mediation sessions were held.  The mediator 
formally terminated the mediation process on January 14, 2014. 
 On or about May 12, 2014, the City filed a petition for interest arbitration.4  By 
letter dated May 13, 2014 to the Director of Conciliation (Director), the PBA 
acknowledged receipt of the petition, stating:   
This will advise that the PBA does not consent to the interest 
arbitration sought by the City, and that the PBA does not 
waive or relinquish its rights under the Act to a continuation 
of the terms contained in the parties’ expired collective 
bargaining agreement until such time as a successor 
agreement is reached, or the PBA files for interest 
arbitration. 5 
 
 This letter went on to request that the City’s petition for interest arbitration not be 
processed.   
 By letter dated May 30, 2014, the Director issued a determination that the Office 
of Conciliation would not process the City’s petition “at this time.”6  The City did not file 
exceptions to this determination. 
 In a letter dated December 23, 2014, the City’s Mayor summarized the 
procedural history of the impasse process and demanded that negotiations begin: 
After negotiations failed, [the PBA] declared impasse on July 
10, 2013.  After mediation failed in the fall of 2013, the City 
filed a Petition for Interest Arbitration with the Public 
Employment Relations Board as is required by the Taylor 
Law.  Rather than participating in the Interest Arbitration 
phase of the impasse procedure … the Ithaca Police 
Benevolent Association, Inc., elected to stand on the 
continuation of the expired agreement for the two year 
period over which an Interest Arbitration Panel would have 
had jurisdiction, namely 2012 and 2013.  Based upon that 
                                                     
4 Charge, Exhibit 2. 
5 Charge, Exhibit 3. 
6 Charge, Exhibit 4. 
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position, the Public Employment Relations Board’s Director 
of Conciliation…declined to process the City’s Petition for 
Interest Arbitration…. 
 
The need to address the economic realities of providing the 
citizenry of Ithaca with an affordable police service are even 
more compelling today than they were three years ago.  
2012 and 2013 are now resolved by virtue of the PBA 
electing to stand on the expired agreement by refusing to 
participate in the Interest Arbitration process.  It is time to 
begin bargaining for a new agreement beginning January 1, 
2014.7 
 
The City’s letter ended with a request that the PBA contact the City’s counsel to 
schedule mutually agreeable dates. 
 By letter dated December 30, 2014, the PBA responded, stating:  
In response to your letter of December 23rd, you are 
incorrect that the PBA’s insistence on a continuation of the 
expired contract terms unless those terms are changed in 
accordance with law forfeits the PBA’s right to negotiate 
terms for a successor contract covering 2012 and 2013.  It 
was PERB’s Director of Conciliation who declined to process 
the City’s petition for interest arbitration.   If the City objected 
to that decision, it should have filed the appropriate appeal in 
a timely manner…. 
 
Demand is hereby made on behalf of the PBA to continue 
negotiations for a successor agreement with an effective date of 
January 1, 2012 not, as you have demanded, January 1, 2014. 8 
 
 The PBA’s letter ended with a request that the City contact the PBA to schedule 
mutually agreeable dates.  On January 26, 2015, the City filed the improper practice 
proceeding at issue. 
DISCUSSION 
 The PBA’s threshold argument can be distilled down to a claim that the charge 
                                                     
7 Charge, Exhibit 5. 
8 Charge, Exhibit 6. 
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was facially deficient and to an assertion that the City’s claim pursuant to § 209.6 of the 
Act constitutes a collateral attack on the Director’s decision not to process the City’s 
interest arbitration petition.     
 The argument that the charge constitutes an improper collateral attack is not 
tenable in light of the Board’s decision in City of Yonkers.9   That case involved an 
employer’s claim that a union had, by refusing to consent to interest arbitration, waived 
its right to negotiate over the two year period which the interest arbitration would have 
covered, and which was held in status quo by the union’s action.  The City sought to 
pursue its claim by filing exceptions to the Director’s determination refusing to process 
the City’s petition for interest arbitration.  The Board upheld the Director’s determination 
based on well-established precedent holding that “an employer does not have the right 
to proceed to interest arbitration without the employee organization’s consent.”10  In 
declining to address the merits of the City’s waiver argument, the Board explained that 
it:   
den[ied] the City’s request that we make a determination that 
[a union] has waived its right to negotiate over, or to 
subsequently seek to arbitrate, the terms and conditions of 
employment for the at-issue two year periods following the 
expiration of the parties' agreement. The appropriate 
procedure for seeking a determination as to whether a party 
has violated its duty to negotiate in good faith is through the 
filing of an improper practice charge pursuant to § 209-a of 
the Act.11 
                                                     
9 46 PERB ¶ 3027 (2013). 
10 Id at 3059, citing City of Kingston, 18 PERB ¶ 3028 (1985); see also County of 
Niagara, 16 PERB ¶ 3071 (1983), vacated sub nom County of Niagara, New York v 
Newman, 122 Misc2d 749, 17 PERB ¶ 7003 (Sup Ct Niagara Co 1984), revd, 104 AD2d 
1, 17 PERB ¶ 7021 (1984); Town of Southampton v. NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 2 
NY3d 513, 37 PERB ¶ 7001 (2004) (citing and relying on City of Kingston).  See 
generally Act, § 209-a(1)(e). 
11 46 PERB ¶ 3027, at 3060 (emphasis added).  
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 The PBA is effectively asking us to penalize the City for following the guidance 
the Board provided only three years ago in City of Yonkers.  Indeed, the PBA expressly 
contends that the appropriate vehicle by which the City could raise its waiver claim is 
that which the Board in Yonkers expressly disallowed, that is, appeal of the Director’s 
decision to not process the City’s interest arbitration petition.  We adhere to the Board’s 
guidance in City of Yonkers that the proper procedural vehicle to litigate such claims is 
through the filing of an improper practice charge.  We accordingly deny the PBA’s 
exceptions.  
 However, as the ALJ correctly held, the mere fact that an improper practice 
proceeding provides the appropriate procedural vehicle by which such claims may be 
resolved, does not necessarily mean that any individual charge has or lacks merit.  We 
therefore turn to the City’s exceptions to the ALJ’s dismissal of its charge.  
 We begin by examining the City’s argument that the PBA’s refusal to consent to 
mandatory interest arbitration waived its right to negotiate for a successor agreement 
covering the years 2012 and 2013.  We agree with the ALJ that the record does not 
support a finding of “a clear, intentional, and unmistakable relinquishment of the right to 
negotiate the particular subject at issue.”12   
 As the ALJ correctly found, the PBA’s letter does not expressly waive the right to 
negotiate the effective period of any contract.  Indeed, the PBA’s letter expressly recites 
that “the PBA does not waive or relinquish its rights under the Act,” and thus cannot be 
viewed as supporting by its terms any such finding.  The City does not contest this.  
                                                     
12 Orchard Park Central School District, 47 PERB ¶3029, 3089 (2014), 
quoting Dutchess Comm College, 46 PERB ¶3009, 3016 (2013); see also County of 
Nassau, 48 PERB ¶ 3014, 3051 (2015) (following Orchard Park). 
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Rather, it argues that the PBA’s actions—that is, standing on its status quo rights and 
declining to participate in interest arbitration that would have covered 2012 and 2013—
were inconsistent with any intention to negotiate for the two years following the 
expiration of the agreement.  Waiver may be demonstrated both by express language, 
not present here, and by conduct, such as silence or inaction, that clearly demonstrates 
an unequivocal intention not to assert the right alleged to have been waived.13  
However, the course of dealing here does not support a finding of waiver by conduct 
inconsistent with subsequent assertion of the right to bargain.   
 Under the Act, “an employer does not have the right to proceed to interest 
arbitration without the employee organization’s consent,” but, absent that consent, can 
only continue to maintain the status quo.14  Likewise, under the Act, the duration of an 
agreement is a mandatory subject.15  Put another way, the Board has found that the Act 
protects both the right of an employee organization to withhold consent to interest 
arbitration and the right to negotiate the duration of an agreement.  As the ALJ correctly 
found, nothing in our prior cases suggests that the exercise of one right entails the 
waiver of the other right.   
 Indeed, such an interpretation of the Act falls afoul of several basic canons of 
                                                     
13  Orchard Park Central School District, 47 PERB ¶3029, at 3089 (“waiver may 
accurately describe a loss of right, such as one relinquished by silence, inaction, or 
certain other types of conduct”); see also Hadden v. Consolidated Edison Co., 45 
N.Y.2d 446, 469 (1978) (“A waiver, the intentional relinquishment of a known right ... 
may be accomplished by express agreement or by conduct or by failure to act so as to 
evince an intent not to claim the purported advantage”).  
14 City of Yonkers, 46 PERB ¶ 3027, at 3059, reaffirming City of Kingston, 18 PERB ¶ 
3036, at 3075-3076.   
15 Inc Village of Old Brookville, 16 PERB ¶ 3094, 3156 (1983), citing Village of 
Lynbrook, 10 PERB ¶ 3067 (1977), confirmed Village of Lynbrook v. Pub Empl 
Relations Bd, 48 NY2d 398, 12 PERB ¶ 7021 (1979). 
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statutory construction, notably that “statutes should be construed to avoid results which 
are absurd, unreasonable or mischievous or produce consequences that work a 
hardship or an injustice.”16  In particular, “an interpretation of an act should be avoided 
which would injuriously affect the rights of others, and that sense should be attached to 
its provisions which will harmonize its objects with the preservation and enjoyment of all 
existing right.”17  In sum, a statute should only be construed to require the forfeiture of 
one statutory right as the price of exercising another when such a reading is compelled 
by the statutory text or other evidence that so harsh a result was intended.18  In the 
absence of language in the Act supporting, let alone compelling, our treating the PBA’s 
exercise of its statutory right to withhold consent to interest arbitration as waiving its 
right to negotiate the duration of a subsequent agreement, we decline to so interpret 
that Act.   
 For all these reasons, we deny the City’s exceptions to the extent they sound in 
waiver.  However, that does not end our inquiry.  The stipulated facts do not make out a 
claim that the PBA waived its right to negotiate for an agreement covering 2012 and 
2013, but they do establish that the City fully satisfied its duty to negotiate in good faith 
for that period.   
 Although the City has incorrectly characterized the nature of its objection to the 
PBA’s demand, the unusual facts here establish a highly atypical instance of duty 
                                                     
16 People v. Dozier, 78 N.Y.2d 242, 249 (1991) (citing McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., 
Book 1, Statutes §§ 141, 143, 145, 146, 148); see also ATM One, LLC v. Landaverde, 2 
N.Y.3d 472, 477 (2004) (same). 
17 Statutes § 146, Comment at 299 (citing cases). 
18 See, eg, County of Albany v Hudson River-Black River Regulating Dist, 97 AD3d 61, 
73 (3d Dept 2012) (“the plain language of a statute may not be overridden to avoid an 
undesirable result in a particular situation”). 
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satisfaction, not of waiver.  That mislabeling does not bar us from considering whether 
the City, having satisfied its duty to negotiate in good faith as to an agreement covering 
2012 and 2013, can be required to revisit those years in negotiations for a successor 
agreement.   Our Rules of Procedure do not “impose a heightened pleading standard 
such that the use of an incorrect characterization of the legal theory supporting the [duty 
satisfaction claim] waives it.”19 
 Because duty satisfaction and waiver have often been confused, the Board 
clarified the distinction between them in Orchard Park Central School District: 
In contrast to duty satisfaction, waiver involves either the 
express relinquishment of specified rights or the use of 
language that establishes “a clear, intentional, and 
unmistakable relinquishment of the right to negotiate the 
particular subject at issue” by relieving the other party of the 
duty to negotiate on that subject. 
 
In short, duty satisfaction is found when the duty to negotiate 
the specific subject at issue has been in fact satisfied, while 
waiver relieves the beneficiary of the specified statutory 
duties, including the duty to negotiate under the Taylor 
Law.20 
 
 In prior cases, the Board has generally found duty satisfaction “when a specific 
subject has been negotiated to fruition and may be established by contractual terms . . . 
demonstrat[ing] that the parties had reached accord on that specific subject.”21  Here, 
however, we are confronted with an almost paradoxical fact pattern: although the 
parties here are entitled to a final determination of their contractual rights through 
mandatory interest arbitration, one party can, by standing on its status quo rights, 
                                                     
19 County of Nassau, 49 PERB ¶ 3001, 3003 (2016).  
20 47 PERB ¶ 3029, 3089 (2014), quoting Dutchess Comm College, 46 PERB ¶3009, 
3016 (2013); see also County of Nassau, 48 PERB ¶ 3014, 3051 (2015). 
21 Id. 
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prevent such a final determination from taking place.  As a result, the corollary question 
arises of whether the other party, which has exhausted all statutory negotiation and 
conciliation processes in good faith, can be compelled to negotiate over the status quo 
period even though agreement was prevented by external circumstances wholly outside 
that party’s control.  We find, as explained more fully below, that the duty to negotiate in 
good faith over the status quo period, here 2012 and 2013, has been satisfied.  
 In the instant case, there is no basis to believe that either party failed to bargain 
in good faith prior to the declaration of the impasse and the exhaustion of conciliation 
procedures.  Indeed, interest arbitration is only available under the Act “when efforts of 
the parties themselves to reach agreement through true negotiations and conciliation 
procedures have actually been exhausted.”22  Here, although “[i]t is well-settled that the 
duty to negotiate in good faith under the Act extends to conduct following a declaration 
of impasse,”23 the City participated in all conciliation proceedings and itself appropriately 
invoked mandatory interest arbitration. 
 Nor can the PBA’s invocation of its right to decline to participate in interest 
arbitration be characterized as bad faith bargaining.  The PBA merely exercised a 
statutory right to stand on the status quo that has been recognized by the Board for over 
three decades.  Thus, we are confronted with a situation in which neither party has 
acted wrongfully, and yet the process designed to achieve finality was effectively 
thwarted, despite the City’s best efforts to achieve that finality.  The policies underlying 
                                                     
22 Town of Haverstraw, 9 PERB ¶ 3063, 3109 (1976); see also Village of Wappingers 
Falls, 40 PERB ¶ 3020, 3083 (2007) (quoting and following Haverstraw); City of 
Newburgh, 15 PERB ¶ 3116, 3180 (1982).  
23 Village of Wappingers Falls, 40 PERB ¶ 3020, at 3083 (citing City of Mount Vernon, 
11 PERB ¶ 3095, 3156 (1978); Poughkeepsie Public School Teachers Assn, 27 PERB 
¶ 3079, 3182 (1994); County of Rockland, 29 PERB ¶ 3009 (1996)). 
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§ 209(4) of the Act are best served by treating the status quo right as a shield, and not 
allowing it to be deployed as a sword to reopen the negotiations for which interest 
arbitration and its resultant finality was avoided.   
 In sum, the City at no point ceased to pursue a final resolution of the impasse, 
and only the PBA’s exercise of its right to decline to participate in interest arbitration 
prevented such a final resolution.  Although no accord was actually reached here, the 
record is clear that the City exhausted all available avenues for negotiation and 
conciliation, thereby satisfying its duty to negotiate in good faith under the Act for the 
applicable duration of an interest arbitration award, which we find here to be the 
presumptive default period of two years from the expiration of the previous agreement, 
that is, calendar years 2012 and 2013.24                 
 However, the mere fact that the City had satisfied its duty to negotiate for that 
time period does not mean that the PBA’s effort to re-negotiate the subject violated the 
duty to negotiate in good faith.  Since the negotiations had just commenced, and the 
City has neither pleaded nor proven that the PBA’s demand constituted a condition on 
bargaining, the fact the demand was made well prior to any declaration of impasse 
means that no improper practice has taken place.25  We therefore affirm the ALJ’s 
finding that no improper practice was committed by the PBA, and her dismissal of the 
charge.  Accordingly, we deny the exceptions filed by the PBA and the exceptions filed 
                                                     
24 We express no opinion as to whether an arbitration award must cover this default 
period or if the two years covered by such an award under the Act may have a different 
start and end time based upon the facts, circumstances, and demands appropriately 
presented to the panel.   
25  Town of Wallkill, 43 PERB ¶ 3026, 3102 & n. 8 (2010), confd Town of Wallkill v NYS 
Pub Empl Relations Bd, 44 PERB ¶ 7004 (Sup Ct Alb Co 2011), citing Peekskill Cent 
Sch Dist, 16 PERB ¶ 3075 (1983); Monroe-Woodbury Teachers Assn, 10 PERB ¶ 3029 
(1977). 
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by the City, and affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
 IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED:  November 15, 2016 
       Albany, New York 
 
 
